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RECENT CASES
that defendant after Heitner.48
The Supreme Court has made the law of in rem jurisdiction com-
port with fairness and substantial justice rather than the mere hap-
penstance of a res within a forum. Now that the idea of searching
for a res upon which to base jurisdiction seems no longer needed the
courts can evaluate the real factors upon which jurisdiction should
be asserted, i.e., minimum contacts.
LAWRENCE D. DuBois
CONTRACTS-SALES-BUY-IN NOTICE INVALIDATES RIGHT TO DEMAND
SHIPMENT OF GRAIN SO THAT ALLEGED FACTS MAY CONSTITUTE A DE-
FENSE OF ECONOMIC DURESS
Appellant contracted on February 1, 1973, to sell 30,000 bushels
of barley to the appellee at $1.22 per bushel. Shipment was to be
made during March and April. Appellant shipped only 3,734 bushels
during that time, contending that appellee had not fulfilled its part
of the bargain.1 The parties attempted to negotiate their differences
over the next few months. Finally, after giving appellant a thirty
day notice, appellee, on November 8, 1973, wrote to appellant in-
forming him that appellee had found it necessary to buy in from the
open market the remaining balance of barley that appellant failed to
ship and that it was charging appellant for the difference between
the market price at that time and the contract price.2 On November
16, 1973, appellant replied by repudiating the contract, disagreeing
with appellee's version of the contract, and denying any liability.
Appellee continued its demand for shipment and finally, on Feb-
ruary 18, 1974, during a phone conversation with appellant, appellee
convinced appellant to ship the remaining balance of barley. During
the next seven weeks the barley was shipped. Appellant then brought
suit,8 alleging that appellant had shipped the barley under economic
48. But It also appears that the Supreme Court sanctions long-arm statutes which treat
the acceptance of a position as an officer or director of a domestic corporation as con-
sent to the jurisdiction of that state's courts. Id.
1. Appellant claimed that appellee had agreed to supply twenty to twenty-five trucks to
ship the grain. The written confirmation of the agreement reached- by phone and sent by
appellee indicated that shipment was to be by rail. Appellant did not acknowledge or re-
turn the confirmation form. Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 552
F.2d 1285, 1287-88 (8th Cir. 1977).
,,2. Id. at 1288.
3. Appellant contended that appellee had breached the contract by not supplying the
trucks to haul the grain and that it was therefore not entitled to delivery at the price
set by the February 1973 contract of $1.22 per bushel which appellee actually paid to ap-
pellant. Instead, appellant sought to recover the excess of market price at the time of the
deliveries (which was in excess of $3.00 per bushel) over the contract price of $1.22 per
bushel. Id. at 1289.
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duress due to threats allegedly made by appellee during the Feb-
ruary 18 telephone conversation.4 The jury returned a dismissal ver-
dict for appellee after the court refused to instruct the jury on the
issue of economic duress.5 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that appellee's
buy-in notice invalidated its right to demand shipment of the grain
so that if the threats alleged were in fact made, they may be suffi-
ciently wrongful to constitute a defense of economic duress.6 James-
town Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 552 F.2d 1285
(8th Cir. 1977).
The doctrine of economic duress or business compulsion could be
described as a hybrid developing from the common law doctrine of
duress and from equity.7 At common law, duress made void a con-
tract where a party was induced to enter into the contract by threats
to his life or person, or of confinement."
From this limited approach to duress equity acted as a tool to
expand common law duress to allow the courts to protect against
coercion in contracts brought on by economic pressure.9 Duress of
goods, which occurs when one party is compelled to submit to an
exaction as a result of another's taking or retention of that party's
goods or money, was one area of expansion, 0 and eventually led to
the development of the doctrine of economic duress or business com-
pulsion.11 It is not unusual to see an overlap of the doctrines of duress
of goods and economic duress in a single case.1
2
4. Appellant alleged that the appellee made the following statement during the Feb.
18, 1974 telephone conversation:
We're General Mills; and if you don't deliver this grain to us, why we'll
have a battery of lawyers in there tomorrow morning to visit you and, and
then we are going to the North Dakota Public Service [Commission] ; we're
going to the Minneapolis Grain Exchange and we're going to the people in
Montana and there will be no more Mutschler Grain Company. We're going
to take your licenser.]
Id.
5. Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 764 (D.N.D.
1976).
6. Appellee disputed the allegation of threats which appellant claims took place in the
Feb. 18 telephone conversation. 552 F.2d at 1291. Except as to the issue of economic
duress the court affirmed the rflings made by the district court in denying appellant's
motion for new trial. Id. at 1294-95.
More importantly, the circuiit court affirmed the district court holding that under
N.D. CENT. CODE Z 41-02-91 (1968), "cover" was not a mandatory remedy and there was
no evidence brought out at trial which was sufficient to indicate that General Mills had
bought in the grain for Jamestown Farmers (seller's) account. Id. at 1293. The court de-
termined that the testimony at trial established only that appellee went into the open
market to buy grain to meet its own sale commitments and that there was no evidence to
show thot annellee bou-ht grain specificall- for ap--ellant's account. Id.
7. See Watts. Economic Duress, and Its Use in Avoiding a Release Agreement, 12 S.
TEx. L.J. 92 (1970).
8. See Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 Mici. L. Rxv. 253
(1947). As Professor Dawson described it, "common law duress was merely a by-product
of legal controls over crime nnd tort." Id. at 254.
9. See supra note 7, at 98.
10. Hackley v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569, 8 N.,V. 511 (1881).
11. See supra note 8.
12. See, e.7,, First National Bank of Cincinnatti v. Pepper, 454 F.2d 626 (2d Cir.
1972): Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 249 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
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Under the doctrine of economic duress a contract is voidable by
the party claiming duress when that party has entered into the agree-
ment under such circumstances of business necessity or compulsion
as will render the agreement or performance involuntary. 3 The
rationale behind the doctrine revolves around the necessity of mutual
assent for there to be a contract. 14 If the freedom of will necessary
to validate the assent is absent,' 5 the party under duress may be al-
lowed to avoid the contract. 16 This free will theory has led to the
application of a subjective standard to determine whether the party
claiming duress gave his assent freely.1
To determine whether the circumstances would allow the victim
to avoid the contract the courts generally require the party claiming
duress to show three things."' First, the circumstances must be shown
to be the result of wrongful, coercive acts 9 or improper threats20 of
Inland Empire Refineries v. Jones, 69 Idaho 335, 206 P.2d 519 (1949); Vine v. Glenn, 41
Mich. 112, 1 NW. 997 (1879) ; Scuriock v. Lovvorn, 410 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. 1966).
13. See 25 AM. JUR. 2d Duress and Undue Influence § 6, at 7 (1966). To establish eco-
nomic duress the circumstances in each case must be related in such a way as to show
not only the existence of duress but also the likelihood of serious harm to the coerced
party's business if the demand Is not met. The circumstances to consider in each case in
determining if there is economic duress are the age and mental ability of the coerced party.
the financial condition of that party and his business, the absence of good faith and rea-
sonable belief by the party making the demand that he was acting properly, the ade-
quacy of consideration, and the adequacy of a legal remedy. Id.
14. 13 WX. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1604 (3d ed. 1970). A person alleging
to have been coerced into a contract while at the same time anticipating the possibility of
gain from the transaction is not under duress. The coercion must be to such a degree as
to negate the existence at all of the element of voluntariness. Id.
Further, a party's allegation of duress as his motive for doing an act will be un-
successful as a defense if that party was already duty bound to perform that obligation
because of a prior proper agreement. Id.
15. Id. at § 1605.
16. Although the cornerstone of the economic duress doctrine has its basis on the theory
of the coerced party lacking freedom of assent, the economic duress doctrine limits Its
application as a defense to a contract only where the other party to the agreement has
imposed the circumstances of duress or knowingly taken advantage of that duress. 25 AM.
JUR. 2d Duress and Undue Influence § 21 (1966). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS states the limitation as follows:
Where the manifestation of assent is Induced by one who Is not a party to
the transaction, the contract is not voidable by the victim if the other party
to the transaction in good faith and without reason to know of the duress
either gives value or relies materially on the transaction.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2) (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977).
17. The subjective and majority test is described in Wise v. Midtown Motors, Inc., 231
Minn. 46, 42 N.WV.2d 404 (1950). The Minnesota Supreme Court stated as follows:
The standards of resisting power of the victim are personal and subjective
rather than objective-that is, the existence of duress is to be determined
by whether the coercion was of such a character as to overcome the free
will of the victim rather than that of a person of ordinary courage and firm-
ness. . . . The test is not the nature of the threats but rather the state of
mind induced thereby in the victim....
Id. at -, 42 N.W.2d at 407. The minority test is objective In nature and requires the
duress to be sufficient to overcome the will of a person of ordinary firmness. It appears
that all jurisdictions who have accepted the economic duress doctrine apply a subjective
test. Pennsylvania applied the objective test as late as 1967. Carrier v. William Penn
Broadcasting Co., 426 Pa. 427, 233 A.2d 519 (1967). The subjective test has now appar-
ently been adopted by Pennsylvania. See Litten v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 220 Pa. Super
Ct. 274, 286 A.2d 913 (1971).
18. Oskey Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1281, 1286 (Oth Cir.
1976).
19. Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 552 F.2d 1285, 1290 (8th
Cir. 1977).
20. According to RIESTATEIENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318 (Tent. Draft NO. 12,
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the other party. Second, the threatened party must show that he had
no other alternative available to him.2 1 Whether a legal remedy
constitutes such an alternative will depend upon the circumstances. 22
Third, the victim must show that he was involuntarily induced into
the agreement or performance.2
3
In addition to the three elements of general duress, the party al-
leging economic duress must also show that the circumstances
brought about by the other party's coercive acts are in the nature
of financial difficulties which compel the victim to make an assent
for the purpose of protecting his business or livelihood.2 4 This fourth
element reflects the characteristic of the doctrine of economic duress
which distinguishes it from other forms of duress; that the other
party has, by his acts or threats, placed the victim in a position of
financial difficulty and then used that position as a lever for gain. 25
Therefore, a contract cannot be avoided under a claim of economic
duress when the coercive acts are done by a third person who is not
a party, and the other party to the agreement has entered into the
transaction in good faith and without reason to know of the duress.26
When all of the above elements have been established, it must
then be shown that the threatened party was compelled to make a
disproportionate exchange of values27 or to give up something for
nothing28 in order to prove economic duress.
It is commonly held that one who threatens to do that which
1977),
(1) A threat is improper if
(a) what is threatened is a crime or a tort or the threat itself would be
a crime or a tort if it resulted in the obtaining of property, or
(b) what Is threatened is the instigation of criminal prosecution, or
(c) what is threatened is the commencement-of- civil process and the
threat is made in bad faith, or
(d) the threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing un-
der a contract with the recipient.
(2) A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not signifi-
cantly benefit the party making the threat, or
(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of assent
Is significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the
threat, or
(c) what Is threatened Is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends.
21. Frielmnan v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 34.7, 350 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d
349 (5th Cir. 1971).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977)
states as follows: "The standard is a practical one, in which account must be taken of
the exigencies in which the victim finds himself, and the mere availability of a legal
remedy is not controlling if it will not afford effective relief." See also Wou v. Galbreath-
Ruffin Realty Co., 22 Misc. 2d 463, 195 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1959).
23. The subjective test of inducement is applied here. See supra note 17.
24. See 13 W. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1617 (3rd ed. 1970).
25. The mere showing of hard bargaining when the party claiming duress is under the
stress of business conditions will not allow the avoidance of the contract by a claim of
duress. Johnson, Drake, & Piper, Inc. v. United States, 531 F.2d 1037, 1042 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
26. See supra note 16.
27. First National Bank of Cincinnati v. Pepper, 547 F.2d 708, 714-15 (2d Cir. 1976).
2S. 13 V. JAEGER, NVILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1617 (3d ed. 1970). See RESTATEMENr
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977).
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he has a legal right to do cannot be exposed to a claim of duress. 29
The general trend, however, is to hold that any threat becomes wrong-
ful or improper, notwithstanding the legality of the threatened act,
if it is used as an extortive measure or in bad faith to make an im-
proper demand.3 0 So, a threat to bring criminal prosecution, 31 to bring
a civil action, 32 to breach a contract, 3 to strike, 34 or to terminate
another's employment may all be sufficiently wrongful to consti-
tute economic duress even though at the time they are per se lawful.3 6
The decision by the court in Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc.
v. General Mills, Inc.37 helped to clarify the limitations placed on
the-rights of parties upon the termination of a contract by holding
that when a buyer of grain has given a buy-in notice to the seller
after the seller has failed to meet its delivery obligations and the
seller then repudiates the contract, both parties have acted to ter-
minate their obligations to deliver or to accept the grain and there-
after the buyer cannot validly claim the right to receive the remain-
ing shipments."8 The district court in denying appellant's post-trial
motion for a new trial did not recognize such a limitation and saw
the demands made by the appellee as valid, and so held that there
was no duress as a matter of law because duress could not be pred-
icated on a lawful demand. 39
The court of appeals, however, by holding that appellee's demand
was not a valid one in light of its buy-in notice and appellant's re-
pudiation of the original contract, felt that appellant had established
29. In regard to this, Professor Dawson states as follows:
It is indeed this concentration on distinctions between legal and illegal
means which has chiefly arrested the modern development of the law of
duress. No single formula has achieved so wide a circulation in the duress
cases as the statement that "it Is not duress to threaten to do what there is
a legal right to do." Certainly no other formula is anything like so mislead-
ing. Its vice lies in the half truth it contains. For an enormous range of con-
duct Is Included in the class of acts that there is a "right" to do (and there-
fore, under this formula, to threaten).
See Dawson, supra note 8, at 287.
30. 552 F.2d at 1290-91.
31. Grasso v. Dean, 171 Neb. 648, 107 N.W.2d 421 (1961).
32. Lundvall v. Hughes, 49 Ariz. 264, 268, 65 P.2d 1377, 1378 (1937). Duress in this
area will generally not be found where the party threatening the civil action had a good
faith belief that he had a valid claim or legal right, 13 W. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CON-
TRACTS § 1607 (3d ed. 1970).
33. Equity Funding Corp. v. Carol Management Corp., 66 Misc. 2d' 1020, 322 N.Y.S.2d
965 (1971), citing Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 35 App. Div. 2d 387,
316 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1970), modified 29 N.Y.2d 124, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22, 272 N.E.2d 533 (1971).
34. See Glicman v. Barker Painting Co., 227 App. Div. 585, 238 N.Y.S. 419 (1930).
35. Laemar v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 435 F.2d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 1970).
36. Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 697 (1971).
37. 552 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1977).
38. Id. at 1290.
39. 413 F. Supp. at 771-74. It is important to point out the distinction between a de-
mand and a threat. The former Is what the coercing party seeks to gain whereas the
latter Is the means used to accomplish that gain. So long as the demand made by a party
Is one to which he has a right then the coercive threat, if lawful, will not create duress.
On the other hand, if that which is demanded is unlawful or something to which the
threatening party has not a right, then the threats made may become wrongful or improper
notwithstanding their lawful nature. See 13 I". JAEGER, WILLISTO.N ON CONTRACTS §i
1606-1607 (3d cd. 1970).
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a triable claim of duress.4 0 Since a question of fact existed as to
whether or not the alleged threats actually took place,'4 1 and the dis-
trict court had ruled on the issue of duress as a matter of law, the
court of appeals was compelled to reverse and remand the case for
a new trial. 42 But in so doing, the court of appeals stated that in or-
der to find duress the jury would also have to determine whether the
appellant's shipment of grain was involuntary43 and whether appel-
lant had alternatives available to him other than to ship the grain."
The court of appeals felt that if the jury found in favor 'of the appel-
lant of those three issues, the appellant would be entitled to avoid
what the court viewed as a new contract created as a result of the
February 18, 1974, telephone conversation for appellant to sell and
ship grain to appellee at the old contract price. 45
Jamestown Farmers Elevator demonstrates how the validity of
the demand acts to control the power of the coerced party to avoid a
contract under a claim of duress. Duress is a state of mind but if a
party was coercively induced to perform an act which it was already
under a legal or contractual duty to perform, then that party should
not be allowed to rescind the contract. 4r He has, at an earlier time,
freely assented to the obligation and unless other circumstances have
prevailed to terminate the obligation his consent should bind him.41
But for the buy-in notice the appellant in Jamestown Farmers Ele-
vator could not have claimed that his duty had ended.48
Jamestown Farmers Elevator also shows how the validity of the
demand can become a determining factor as to whether the threat
is considered wrongful or improper' 9 The appellee, regardless of
appellant's actions, had a legal right to perform the acts allegedly
threatened. When those acts were threatened to accomplish some-
thing to which the threatening party had no valid right to demand,
however, the threats became extortive in nature. Even though the
threats were legal remedies available to the threatening party, their
true purpose had been abused. 50
40. 552 F.2d at 1291.
4t. Id. at 1290.
42. Id. at 1295.
43. Id. at 1291.
4.1. 1l.
45. 1(1. at 1291-92.
46. See 13 N. JAEGER, VILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 4 1604 (3rd ed'. 1970).
47. Id.
4S. 552 F.2d at 1290. The hu-in notice sent to appellant by appellee Indicated that
appellee was no longer willing to accept the grain but instead demanded money damages
for the difference in the price of grain at the time of delivery, $1.22 per bushel, and the
m;irkt price at the date of the buy-in notice, $1.94 per bushel. 1d. Had the notice left
the option of delivery oT)en to appellant It is quite possible that the district court's ruling
oil e(conomn1ic' duresS Would have been affirmed. See supra note 39.
49. See supra notes 20 & 39.
50. Austin v. Wilder, 26 N.C. Apn. 229, -- , 215 S.E.2d 794, 797 (1975). The judicial
danger in this area lies in distinguishing between extortion and hard bargaining in good
f:ith. Ne, lilacki [I k 'ilpeline (o. v. 'rnon COnst"uc(tiOn, Inc ., 5:S S.W .2d 80, 90 (Tex.
1 976).
RECENT CASES 273
It is from this basis that the court of appeals held the alleged
threats improper. 51 Because the appellee's demand for sale and ship-
ment of the grain at the original price was held to be outside the
scope of appellee's rights,5 2 then the threats in the nature of those
allegedly made to put appellant out of business,5 3 or to institute crimi-
nal or regulatory proceedings5 4 for the purpose of securing the other
party's consent to an undeserved bargain, were wrongful. 55
The North Dakota courts, although certainly recognizing the de-
fense of general duress, have not formally adopted the economic
duress doctrine.58 In North Dakota duress ha's been statutorily de-
fined,57 but the list of definitions can arguably be considered non-
exclusive.5 8 The statute has been part of North Dakota law from
territorial days with no changes in the wording from that time.59
The earlier North Dakota cases dealing with duress allowed recovery
of taxes paid under protest of their illegality where the alternative
was a sale of the victim's property.60 Recovery has also been al-
lowed for money paid under protest on defective farm equipment
for the purpose of releasing a crop lien. 61 The economic duress doc-
trine is widely accepted in American jurisdictions 2 and it would seem
only a matter of time before it is accepted by North Dakota courts.6 3
Upon remand, appellant in Jamestown Farmers Elevator will
bear a heavy burden in proving its claim of. economic duress.6 4 The
result may be that the appellant's claim will fail for a lack of invol-
untary inducement, or for the existence of a reasonable alternative,
51. See 552 F.2d at 1290.
62. Id.
53. Mayerson v. Washington 2dfg. Co., 58 F.R.D. 377, 383-84 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
54. Balling v. Finch, 203 Cal. App. 2d 413, - , 21 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493-94 (1962).
55. 552 F.2d at 1291.
56. -See Production Credit Association of Minot v. Geving, 218 N.W.2d 185, 195 (N.D.
1974).
57. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-05 (1975). The statute states that duress consists of the
following:
1. Unlawful confinement of the person of a party to a contract, of the hus-
band or wife of such party, or of an ancestor, descendant, or adopted child
of such party, husband, or wife;
2. Unlawful detention of the property of any such person ; or
3. Confinement of such person, lawful in form, but fraudulently obtained, or
fraudulently made unjustly harassing or oppressive.
58. California's statutory definition of duress is identical to that of North Dakota. See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1569 (West 1954). Although by a strict construction of these definitions
only a limited version of the economic duress doctrine could be adopted involving detention
of property, the California judiciary has adopted a more liberal and complete doctrine of
economic duress. See Louisville Title Ins. Co. v. Surety Title & Guaranty Co., 60 Cal. APP.
3d 781, 132 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1976) ; Balling v. Finch, 203 Cal. App. 20 413, 21 Cal. Rptr. 490
(1962). It would therefore seem that a similar liberal interpretation of the statutes Is
available to the North Dakota courts.
59. See DAK. TEAR. CiV. CODE § 880 (1S77).
60. St. Anthony & Dakota Elevator Co. v. Soucie, 9 N.D. 346, 83 N.W. 212 (3900).
61. Bratberg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., 61 N.D. 452, 238 N.W. 552 (1931).
62. See 12 V. JAE(;FR, VII.IMAST ' ON 0oNTI:\CTS § 1602 (3d ed. 1970).
63. In PCA v. Geving, 21.8 N.W.2d 185, 19,-96 (N.D. 1974), the wording of the court
and even the manner in which it disposed of duress strongly suggests that the formal
adoption of the economic duress doctrine will soon come to pass in North Dakota.
64. 5;2 F.2d at 1292. Duress must be proved generally by clear and convincing evidence.
2.5 AM. JUe. 2d Dure a , md lTnddli !nflenr,. § 33 (19Cf).
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or both. These issues and whether the threats actually existed will
have to be decided by the jury on re-trial 5 The court of appeals de-
cision properly gives the appellant the opportunity to make its claim
before a jury. In addition, and in all fairness, whether the appellee
acted in good faith, though mistaken, in making its demand and to
what extent such a good faith but mistaken belief should negate the
wrongfulness of the threat, should also be considered.6 6 Whatever the
result, Jamestown Farmers Elevator shows that each case in which
economic duress is alleged must be decided on its facts, and no pre-
diction can be made of the result in any particular case.67
RICHARD GEIGER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION OF
A DRIVER'S LICENSE WITHOUT PRIOR HEARING DEEMED CONSTITU-
TIONALLY ADEQUATE
Plaintiff's driver's license was revoked, without preliminary hear-
ing, under an Illinois statute' which provided for such suspension
or revocation upon a showing that the driver had been repeatedly
convicted of traffic offenses indicating either an inability to exercise
ordinary and reasonable care in operating a motor vehicle or dis-
respect for the traffic laws and safety of other persons upon the
highway. Plaintiff2 made no request for an administrative hearing,
65. 552 F.2d at 1291.
66. The court stated as follows: "We recognize that good faith Insistence upon a legal
right which one believes he has usually is not duress, even if it turns out that that party
Is mistaken and, In fact, has no such right." Id. at 1290. It can certainly be argued that
the court of appeals did not give enough consideration to appellee's good faith belief that
It had a right to demand shipment of the grain.
67. SeC 13 \\. JAEGER, WII.LISTO ON CONTILACTS § 1613 (3d ed. 1970).
1. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 951/2, 6-206(a,) (3) (1971) provides as follows:
(a)The Secretary of State is authorized to suspend or revoke the license or
permit of any person without preliminary hearing upon a showing by his
records or other sufficient evidence that such person:
3. Has been repeatedly Involved as a driver in motor vehicle collisions or
has been repeatedly convicted of offenses against laws and ordinances regu-
latirg the movement oZ traffic, to a degree which indicates lack of ability
to exercise ordinary and reasonable care In the safe operation of a motor
vehicle or disrespect for the traffic laws and the safety of other persons
upon the highway ...
2. Plaintiff was a resident of Chicago, employed as a truck driver. His license was
suspend ed in November 1969 as a result of his having been convicted of traffic offenses
three times within a twelve-month period. He was later convicted for driving while his
license was suspended and consequently another suspension was Imposed in March 1970.
Hoe received no further citations until August 1974, when he was arrested on two separate
occasions for speeding. After having been convicted on both charges, he received a third
speeding citation in February 1975. On March 27, 1975, he was notified by letter that his
driving privil,'.ze- would cease if he was convicted of a third offense. On March 31, 1975,
he was convicted on the third charge. On June 3, 1975, plaintiff received notice of revoca-
